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Abstract: This essay discusses the ideas of a societal generation through five 
Finnish generational movements of the intellectuals. The essay shows that although 
the ideas of societal generation can be a fruitful way to approach cultural-historical 
phenomena, it has its problems. The main difficulty in applying the theory stems 
from the fact that since the concept of a societal generation is modern, it can be 
problematic to apply it to the generations before the 1920s as well as to late-modern 
generations. Another challenge in using the theory lies in the fact that becoming a 
generational movement presupposes the self-consciousness of coevals as belonging 
to a generation in order to become one.   
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Introduction 
As a sociological concept, the idea of a generation has been widely 
applied to societal and cultural movement studies. It could also 
provide useful insights into the dynamics of a cultural-history 
phenomenon. For instance, when applying the concept to a relatively 
small group rather than to a large societal movement, the concept can 
provide fruitful insights into an important cultural movement. On the 
other hand, if a generation consists of a small elite, the explanatory 
power justifying such a movement diminishes – especially if the goal 
is to explain the wider mentality of a given society.  
In this essay, I look at how the sociological concept of a 
generation can be adapted to the historical studies of generational 
movements. My case studies concern the Finnish cultural 
intellectuals of the twentieth century. I have analysed the topic in my 




1913). 1  Particularly, the study looks at four Finnish societal 
generations from the point of view of student activism. 2  These 
included the inter-war right-wing nationalists, the post-war literary 
minded movement, the Sixties and Seventies left-wing activism and 
the 1980s postmodernists. I have been particularly interested in how 
these generational movements developed their worldview in their 
cultural periodicals and magazines, which can be seen as a marriage 
between literature and journalism. 
I also want to locate the earlier Finnish literary cultural elite 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the chain of 
Finnish intellectual generations. These notions are based on another 
project titled “From Culture to Politics: The Dynamics between the 
Cultural and the Political Public Sphere in Finland in the Early 
Twentieth Century”.3 I discuss this early twentieth-century liberal 
intellectuals in the light of the later history of the Finnish cultural and 
societal generations: could this early nineteenth-century elite 
likewise be seen as a generational movement in the sense of a societal 
generation? Secondly, I discuss the advantages and disadvantages of 
the concept of a societal generation in studies on intellectual history. 
 
A societal generation 
A generation as a societal concept – other than in an ancient 
genealogical meaning – is as “old” as sociology. In the nineteenth 
century, Auguste Comte (1798–1857), John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) 
and Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) were among the most important 
                                                 
1 Jukka Kortti, Ylioppilaslehden vuosisata (Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2013).  
2  See also “Generations and Media History,” in Broadband Society and 
Generational Changes, L. Fortunati and F. Colombo (ed.) in the series Participation 
in Broadband Society - Volume 5 (Frankfurt am Main, Berlin: Peter Lang, 2011), 
69–93. This essay, particularly the present chapter, contains some material from the 
article, albeit edited and redefined. 
3 The project is funded by The Finnish Cultural Foundation. Later, when I suggest 
more detailed information about the cases, I predominately refer to my articles 




theoreticians who started to consider generations on the collective 
level and not only as being completely analogous to a family 
generation.4 However, the most important theories of the modern 
generation were formulated in Europe in the 1920s: the Spanish 
cultural philosopher José Ortega y Gasset and the French cultural 
philosopher François Mentré, for instance. At the same time German 
sociologists produced ambitious societal theories on the concept of 
generations.5 The most well-known of these generational theories of 
the 1920s is undoubtedly Karl Mannheim’s article Das Problem der 
Generationen from 1928.6  
The essential theoretical apparatus in Mannheim’s sociology 
of knowledge was Zeitgeist (the spirit of the age), which was an 
important element in his generational theorising as well. It referred 
to the presumptions and unquestioned basic experiences of a certain 
historical era. What creates the Zeitgeist are societal changes. The 
mobilisation of generations is effected not only by the birth year and 
by the age of individuals, but also the epoch, which often contains 
societal crises. 7  Crises have a particular effect on the youth. 
Mannheim speaks of formative tendencies and formative principles, 
which can bind groups together and which are capable of becoming 
the basis of continuing practice. These formative experiences and 
events may include wars, such as World War I in Robert Wohl’s 
                                                 
4 See e.g. Julián Marìas, Generations: A Historical Method (Tuscaloosa, AL: The 
University of Alabama Press, 1970), 18–80. 
5 Robert Wohl, The Generation of 1914 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1979), 2–3. 
6  Karl Mannheim, ”Das Problem der Generationen,” in Karl Mannheim: 
Wissenssoziologie. Auswahl aus dem Werk (Berlin: Luchterhand, 1964), 509–565. 
I use the English translation of the article: Karl Mannheim, “The problem of 
generations,” in The New Pilgrims: Youth Protest in Transition, eds P.G. Altbach 
and R.S. Laufer (New York, NY: David McKay, 1972), 101–137. 
7 Alaminos, Antonio & Clemente Penalva (2012) “The Cognitive Mobilization 
Index: Crises and Political Generations’ SAGE Open 1–12. Published online 5 





generational study – the seminal account of the birth of the modern 
concept of a societal generation.8  
In this way, different generational units, which were also 
important in Mannheim’s generational thinking, were born. And 
although these units could be very different, even opposed to each 
other, they eventually articulate a destiny that unites the whole 
generation. The spirit of the time for Mannheim was the “spirit of an 
epoch” or the “mentality of a period.”9 In other words, the same era 
is different for people of varying ages and thus experiencing the spirit 
of a common era is only achieved between coevals.10 
Consequently, the formation of a generation depends upon the 
relative speed of social change. When it is very rapid, generational 
differences are magnified. In other words, the emergence of a new 
generation depends entirely on the trigger action of the social and 
cultural processes in question.11 Societal, cultural and particularly 
political turmoil have been the driving forces for the Finnish societal 
generations of the twentieth century.   
 
The Finnish generations from two intellectual extremes of the 
twentieth century 
I have previously analysed Finnish generational movements from the 
point of view of the young intellectuals of the twentieth century. My 
empirical data has mostly consisted of my project on the 100-year 
history of Ylioppilaslehti. The student magazine, still published today, 
was founded in 1913 as the arena for all Finnish-speaking regional 
student associations – so-called student nations. After the Second 
World War, the Student Union of the University of Helsinki, which 
                                                 
8 Wohl, The Generation of 1914; Mannheim, “The problem of generations,” 120. 
9 On the role of mentality in creating the worldview of a generation, see Kortti, 
“The Problem of Generations and Media History,” 74–77.  
10 Mannheim, “The problem of generations,” 129.  
11  Marvin Rintala, The Constitution of Silence. Essays on Generation Themes 





soon became one of the richest student unions in the world due to its 
properties in the heart of Helsinki, took possession of the paper. 
Overall, Ylioppilaslehti is not just “any student paper”; it is a 
significant Finnish cultural and political institution. Through its 
editors, it has borne witness to the lives of the majority of the Finnish 
political and cultural elite of the twentieth century. 
Through its history, I analysed four generational movements. 
Accordingly, I further compared cases concerning the interwar right-
wing nationalists and Sixties and Seventies left-wing activism.  
As in many European countries, a strong right-wing 
nationalism arose in Finland during the interwar period. The 
activities of the young Finnish elite concentrated specifically on the 
Academic Karelian Society (AKS). The association emerged from 
the revenge-spirited Karelian idea. The original main idea was to 
reclaim the Eastern Karelian parts abandoned to Soviet Russia in the 
“Shame Treaty” of Tartu (1920). Finland became independent from 
Russia in 1917, but the borders were not clear until the Treaty of Tartu. 
The bloody Finnish Civil War (1918), the Estonian War of 
Independence (1918–1920) and particularly the so-called Kindred 
Nations Wars (1918–1922) – all consequences of the Russian 
Revolution of 1917 – were the formative experiences for the first 
generation of the AKS. Besides the Karelian idea, the association 
favoured Russophobia, the idea of a “Greater Finland,” and, later in 
the 1930s, fascist-minded right-wing nationalism. The AKS was 
unfavourable to liberalism, pluralism, socialism and communism, 
stock jobbing, foreigners, urbanity and “snobbery”.   
The AKS soon became a hegemonic movement among the 
university students, and the first institution it took over within student 
circles was Ylioppilaslehti. Besides disappointment with what an 
independent Finland looked like, the AKS was also the conservative 
reaction of the agrarian middle class to modernisation. The 
uncertainty about the future, due to the economic situation after the 
First World War, made the youth anxious. The association was highly 




slowed down by the arrogant Swedish-speaking upper class. 
According to the ideas of “True Finnishness”, this was particularly 
carried out in the enduring campaigning for the finnicisation of the 
University of Helsinki. The AKS managed to mobilise petitions, 
mass demonstrations and orchestrate other means, such as infiltrating 
other associations, to use not only extra parliamentary but also 
parliamentary pathways in the campaigns that were launched in the 
provinces as well.12  
If one considers that, in order to call a generational unit “a 
generation”, it should create at least some kind of hegemonic 
discourse among coevals, the AKS undoubtedly achieved it among 
the Finnish academic youth during the 1920s and the 1930s.  
The same could be said about the Sixties’ generation – or in 
the Finnish case discussed here, the Seventies’ generation. As is well 
known, during the 1960s, traditions and institutions were on a 
collision course with the baby boomers when they managed to 
challenge the old “bourgeoisie hegemony”. The Sixties was an 
intellectual revolution, “the great age of Theory” as Tony Judt puts 
it.13 Before 1968, Finnish student activism was mostly in the hands 
of liberal and left-wing radicals. Nevertheless, when the Western 
New Left started to build a “collective intellectual” – a framework 
independent of party, state, and university,14 the Finnish New Left 
took another direction after the Soviet Union occupation of 
Czechoslovakia in August 1968. It soon became a formative 
                                                 
12 For more on the finnicisation of the University of Helsinki in the mid-war period 
from the point view of Ylioppilaslehti; see Jukka Kortti, “Ylioppilaslehti and the 
University’s Language Struggle in the 1920s and 1930s,” Kasvatus & Aika 3 (4) 
2009, 7–23. 
13 Tony Judt, Postwar. A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin Books, 
2005), 398, 403, 407. 
14 Dick Flacks, “Making History and Making Theory. Notes on How Intellectuals 
Seek Relevance,” in Intellectuals and Politics. Social Theory in a Changing World, 





experience for the generation together with diverse forms of student 
activism in “the year of the barricades”.15 Unlike in other Western 
countries, the Finnish intellectuals for the most part turned pro-Soviet 
in choosing a Leninist authorized centralism and proletarian 
dictatorship instead of Trotskyism or Maoism, as in most other 
radical movements in the West at the time. So-called Taistoism was a 
Finnish version of the Stalinistic, orthodox communist movement in 
the 1970s.  
As the AKS, Taistoists managed to mobilise large masses of 
students – and not only students but high school teenagers as well. 
Likewise, the AKS had a strong hold among the youth during its 
fascist period in the 1930s. And whereas the AKS wanted to finnicise 
the University, left-wing radicalism of the Sixties and Seventies pled 
for university democracy. Taistoists similarly infiltrated sections of 
society other than the university; actually, it was one of the main 
strategies of the movement in their “world revolution”.  
Taistoists also had another element of the societal movements 
that was obviously stronger than with the interwar right-wing 
nationalists: the generational conflict with their parents. These 
“children of the soldiers” 16 went so far on the political spectrum from 
their parents’ generation (including admiring the former enemy of 
war, the Soviet Union) that the conflict was inevitable. The 
nationalistic ideology of the interwar period instead stems from the 
same bourgeoisie patriotic grounds as the former generation, yet the 
AKS attacked the conservatism of the older generations. Both 
movements also embittered those who were opposed to their ideology 
and activities and were the object of their terror.  
However, it must be emphasised that although these 
influential intellectual societal movements managed to have a 
                                                 
15 David Caute, Sixty-Eight. The Year of the Barricades (London: Hamish Hamilton, 
1988). 
16 This refers to the seminal Finnish study on the Sixties’ generation by cultural 





hegemonic role among the younger generations, they were only 
factions of the cohort – also among the elite. During the 1920s and 
1930s, there was an influential generational cultural movement called 
Tulenkantajat (The Flame Bearers). This generation of writers and 
poets adapted modern European ideas of literature and culture. 
However, during the 1920s, Tulenkantajat was not actually in 
opposition to the AKS, because some of the intellectuals operated in 
both movements. It was in the 1930s, when the group turned to the 
left as the political climate changed. Unlike in many European 
countries, for example as in Sweden, in Finland a cultural left during 
the inter-war period barely existed. This was mostly due to the fact 
that the rise of right-wing politics managed to make the communist 
party illegal in Finland during the 1930s, although fascists never 
managed to come to power. Nevertheless, the Finnish minor left 
intellectuals of the 1930s, who had to operate mostly underground, 
criticised the AKS heavily.  
Taistoists never had a majority anywhere – not in The 
Communist Party of Finland SKP (more of a Euro-communist faction 
had a majority), nor in the student world, except in certain 
associations at the University of Helsinki and the University of 
Tampere for a short period in the 1970s. However, Taistoists had an 
influence on the Finnish public sphere. They were a small but vocal 
minority among the cultural and academic elite, and they had a 
powerful ally, the Soviet Union, which had a habit of getting involved 
in Finnish internal affairs during the Cold War era. Taistoists often 
branded as anti-Soviet those who said anything against the politics of 
the Soviet Union. Particularly the influence of Taistoist on Finnish 
cultural life, as well as among journalists, made them look much 
more influential than they actually were.  
 
Defining “modern” among the young intellectuals 
After the Second World War, Finnish political as well as cultural life 
had to separate from the right-wing nationalists that dominated the 




Second World War, but it was feared that Finland would follow in 
Czechoslovakia’s footsteps – that the Soviet Union might turn 
Finland into a communist Soviet satellite. During these “Years of 
Danger” after the war, communists resurfaced and regrouped 
themselves. However, while they managed to enter the government 
of Finland, to gain power in the security policy of Valpo17 and to 
increase their power in cultural institutions, such as the national 
broadcasting company Yle, Finland remained a Western capitalist 
society.  
Nevertheless, the bourgeoisie had to temper the nationalistic 
tones of its activities – or at least quiet them down somewhat. For 
instance, student activists were forced to concentrate on cultural 
issues. One solution was to found organisations such as the Academy 
of Finland for cultural activities to flourish after the war. On the 
surface, these activities appeared to be non-political. The underlying 
motivation of the prime movers of the traditionalists behind the 
Academy of Finland, however, was to resist that people, particularly 
student youth, would fall under the influence of the communists.  
Meanwhile, another faction emerged among the bourgeoisie-
educated class that was more liberal and international. This new 
generation of modernists, whose important forum Ylioppilaslehti 
became in the 1950s, reached beyond Finnish ethnological national 
issues and out into the international currents. But, unlike in many 
other Western cultures, Finnish modernism was apolitical: the 
Finnish liberal writers, poets and critics of the 1950s were 
predominantly interested in modernist aesthetics rather than 
                                                 
17 Valpo (in Finnish: Valtiollinen Poliisi, in English: State Police) was called “Red 
Valpo” during the years 1944–1948. After the Second World War, the State Police 
was substantially re-organised. A majority of the old staff was replaced by the left-
minded officers. The Soviet Union, especially the leader of the Allied Control 
Commission in Finland Andrei Ždanov, had a significant effect in the forming of 
“Red Valpo”. After communists suffered a defeat in the July 1948 parliamentary 





representing any political agenda.  
However, this group was very small (ten to fifteen individuals) 
and exclusive. Although the period lifted up many important young 
critics and artists, the age range of this rather small group was fairly 
large. There were “angry young men” in their twenties, but also war 
veterans such as Eino S. Repo (born 1919), who became the 
controversial head of the Finnish broadcasting company Yleisradio 
in the mid-1960s. Nonetheless, these two generational factions, the 
traditionalists and the modernists, locked horns in the 1950s in many 
areas of culture.18  
Defining the modern19 was a case also in the 1980s when a 
new generation of young intellectuals emerged in Finland. For 
instance, in journalism this certain postmodern attitude was realised 
in highly subjective, provocative and often ironic “gonzo journalism” 
that was fashionable among Finnish journalists in the early 1980s.20 
They wrote ironic articles about those in power, whether they were 
Finnish cultural figures of previous generations or politicians or even 
– which was the most provocative during the Finnish Cold War era – 
Soviet leaders. This new postmodern attitude was manifested also in 
the provocative aesthetics in the magazines’ layout and 
photojournalism, for instance. The overall change in the Finnish 
media sphere with the coming of independent commercial radio, free 
papers and other deregulation of media increased the possibilities for 
an experimental and anti-authorial “postmodern” attitude. DYI (do it 
                                                 
18  For more about this struggle, see Jukka Kortti (2011), “Building the New 
Cultural Finland. The Student Magazine Ylioppilaslehti, The Public Sphere and 
The Creation of the Finnish Cultural Elite in the Post-War Era,” Scandinavian 
Journal of History, 36:4 (2011), 462–478. 
19 For more on defining the modern among the Finnish intellectuals, see Jukka 
Kortti, “Media, the Elite and Modernity. Defining the Modern among the Finnish 
Cultural Intelligentsia in the Twentieth Century,” International Journal for History, 
Culture and Modernity, 2:1 (2014), 1–24. 
20 For instance, The Great Shark Hunt by Hunter S. Thompson was translated into 




yourself) ideology, which was one of the core ideas of the punk 
movement, and was popular among the young intellectuals in the 
freer societal sphere of 1980s Finland.   
This 1980s generation has had many names, such as the ‘punk 
generation’, the ‘79-generation’, the ‘suburban generation’, the ‘in-
between generation’, the ‘media generation’ etc. Besides media, this 
new attitude, whether one calls it postmodernism or something else, 
can also be found in literature and other arts (the rise of performance 
art, for instance). As Anthony Giddens21 puts it, postmodernism, “if 
it means anything” is most a relevant concept when it “concerns 
aspects of aesthetic reflection upon the nature of modernity,” 
meaning not only styles, but especially movements in the arts and 
architecture.   
Nevertheless, those cultural activists, who were the prime 
movers during the era, were also people in their twenties. If one 
considers that, in order to become a generational movement, the 
coevals need to have certain formative tendencies. For the 1950s 
modernists, it obviously was the Second World War, even though the 
younger members of the movement did not participate in the fighting. 
However, if we try to find similar tendencies among the 1980s 
generation, the idea is hard to match. Yet, there was an influential and 
visible faction of this generation – the environmentalists – who 
established the political party of the Finnish Green League later in 
the 1980s. The catalyst that launched Finnish environmental activism 
was the so-called Koijärvi Movement of 1979. The objective of the 
movement was to prevent the draining of a lake in southern Finland, 
and for many environmental activists it certainly was a formative 
experience. Nevertheless, these activists were only one rather minor 
faction of the generation although many of them were visible figures 
in periodicals and commercial radio mentioned in the 1980s. 
However, what was common for this generation – from the green 
                                                 
21 Anthony Giddens, The Concequences of Modernity (Cambridge, UK: Polity 




activists to post-punk rockers – was the new “city culture” that 
flourished especially in the capital of Helsinki in the 1980s. The 
change in the media sphere was the most obvious sign of that.  
However, as well known, postmodernism did not create any 
coherent theory, but arguments were often contradicted in ‘the 
cultural logic of late capitalism’22 and ‘the culture of narcissism’.23 
The ideas of playing with identities in an ever-changing subjectivity, 
to use irony, pastiche etc. are difficult to apply to the ideas of a 
societal generation that would call a coherent worldview into play. In 
the movements of the 1980s, the same people were often concerned 
with both the environment and posing. In other words, the idea that 
“we” has atomised in the postmodern society24 does not fit in with 
the ideas of the Mannheimian generational unit.  
 
Two generations of nineteenth-century liberal intellectuals 
So if a societal generation as a modernist theory might be difficult to 
adapt to late-modern generations, what about the generations before 
the First World War? Let us now look at the Finnish liberal 
intellectuals of the nineteenth century from the viewpoint of a 
societal generation.  
In his dissertation,25 social scientist Matti Virtanen defines the 
Finnish societal generations as “the successors of the Fennoman 
movement” (fennomanian perilliset). By this, he means that all the 
Finnish societal generational movements up to the present are rooted 
                                                 
22 Fredrick Jameson, Postmodernism – Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism 
(London: Verso, 1991). 
23  Christopher Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism. American Life in An Age of 
Diminishing Expectations (New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1991). 
24 See for example Scott Lash, “Reflexivity and its Doubles. Structure, Aesthetics, 
Community”, 143–156 in Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and 
Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order, eds Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and 
Scott Lash (Cambridge, UK:  Polity Press, 1994), 110–173. 
25  Matti Virtanen, Fennomanian perilliset: poliittiset traditiot ja sukupolvien 




in the nationalistic Fennoman movement that originated in the mid-
nineteenth century. Yet it came into existence from within the 
Swedish-speaking elite, whereby the Fennomans pushed for the 
promotion and strengthening of the Finnish language and Finnic 
culture – to distance it from Swedish or Scandinavian culture. The 
idea was to distance it from its peasant-status to the position of a 
national language and national culture. The whole movement, as well 
as its successors, was highly influenced by the Hegelian philosopher 
and statesman J.V. Snellman (1806–1881).26  
In the 1890s, the Fennoman movement divided into two 
separate branches: the conservative and moderate “Old Finns” and 
the more liberal and radical “Young Finns”. Politically, the main 
dividing factor was the attitude towards the Russification policies 
implemented by the Russian Empire in the late 1890s. The artistic 
faction of the Young Finns was formed by the major figures of the 
“the Golden age of Finnish art”, who were born in the early 1860s: 
the painters Eero Järnefelt (1863–1937), Akseli Gallén-Kallela 
(1865–1931), Emil Wikström (1864–1942) and Pekka Halonen 
(1865–1933), the composer Jean Sibelius (1865–1957) and the 
authors Juhani Aho (1861–1921) and Arvid Järnefeld (1861–1932). 
The two last-mentioned belonged to the founders of the newspaper 
Päivälehti (later Helsingin Sanomat), which became the chief organ 
of the Young Finns.  
Of the cultural periodicals, the main publication of this 
generation of intellectuals was Valvoja, established already in 1880 
by historians, philologists, philosophers and linguists, who were or 
became major figures among the Finnish-speaking academics, some 
of them made their marks as politicians as well. One of the active 
contributors of Valvoja was the writer Juhani Aho who has been 
called “the first Finnish professional author”. He also worked as a 
                                                 
26  See Jukka Kortti, “Intellectuals and the State: The Finnish University 





journalist and published, together with his brother Pekka Brofeldt 
(1864–1945), the magazine Uusi Kuvalehti (New Pictorial Magazine) 
(1890–1903) from 1892. Uusi Kuvalehti was, as its titled indicates, a 
pictorial magazine. A great portion27 of the content of the articles 
were about geography and travel. Yet the Young-Finn-minded Uusi 
Kuvalehti was not political until the Russification started at the turn 
of the twentieth century. Russification, so called “the first years of 
oppression” largely created both passive and active resistance all over 
the country. The Young Finns, who were constitutionalists, fiercely 
opposed the changed policies of the Mother country. 
The key societal encouragement for Aho’s generation was the 
radical Fennoman movement KTP of the 1880s. This student-based 
movement was an ardent nationalist and eager social-reformist 
organisation that pushed through Finnish language and culture, as 
well as democracy and liberalism, without involving individualism. 
The movement was very influential among the student generation of 
the late 1870s and the 1880s.     
Another later ‘great man’ of Finnish literature, the poet Eino 
Leino (b. 1878–1926) belonged to a younger generation of the liberal 
Young Finns. Leino, likewise, was an active newspaper writer, who 
contributed to cultural periodicals and magazines. He founded the 
cultural periodical Nykyaika (Modern Times, 1897–1899), together 
with his older brother Kasimir Leino (b. 1866–1919). Although the 
periodical outlined in its sample issue that it would be “a popular 
periodical for literature, art, science, commerce, industry, and societal 
issues”, and that politics did not belong to its editorial policy,28 “the 
years of oppression” forced Nykyaika to take a stand on the political 
                                                 
27  According to my content analysis, almost a quarter of the article content 
concerned geography and travel in 1897–1903, when it was usually no more than 
5 per cent in the cultural periodicals of the era. See Jukka Kortti ”Kulttuurista 
politiikkaan: Aho, Leino ja kulttuurilehdet estetiikan ja politiikan rajoilla,” Ennen 
ja nyt 5/2016. http://www.ennenjanyt.net/2016/12/kulttuurista-politiikkaan-aho-
leino-ja-kulttuurilehdet-estetiikan-ja-politiikan-rajoilla/  




turmoil.   
Later in the mid-1900s, Leino was a driving force behind the 
cultural periodical Päivä (1907–1911), yet he did not belong to the 
editorial staff, but published articles and particularly poems in the 
paper. First of all, he was a central figure in the circle of Päivä – the 
group on cultural intellectuals that gathered regularly in the editorial 
office of the periodical. These intellectuals included, again, the main 
figures of “the Golden age of Finnish art”, but the group was mainly 
formed by the younger generation of artists, writers and academics. 
For this generation, at least for those born in the late 1870s and early 
1880s, the formative years were the “the first years of oppression,” 
the Russification period from the October Manifesto by Tsar 
Nicholas II (1894–1917) to the General Strike in Finland as a part of 
the Russian revolution of 1905. Already in the 1890s, the division of 
the Fennoman movement had meant that the cultural faction of the 
“Young Finns” saw that the previous generation did not push Finnish 
culture forward. During the Russification period, the liberal ideas of 
the Young Finns were mixed with nationalism, which differentiated 
Finnish liberals from Scandinavian and other Western European 
liberals.  
Nevertheless, from the point of view of cultural activism, it is 
difficult to find themes and issues that were common, particularly for 
intellectuals of the same age. For instance, the critical relationship to 
religion, especially towards state-church Christianity, was an 
important issue amongst the Finnish liberal intellectuals in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries – just as everywhere in the 
Western “republic of letters”. It was important for Juhani Aho’s 
generation of the radical Fennomen of the 1880s, but also for Eino 
Leino’s generation alike. During the most critical period towards 
state-church Christianity in the 1900s and 1910s, one of the most 
eager critics of the era was educator and writer Ernst Lampén (1865–





Overall, generation was not an underlining force that united 
the liberal cultural intellectuals of the era. More important than an 
age or even a “formative experience” was Zeitgeist; the societal 
turmoil and internationalism that fuelled the cultural activists.     
 
Conclusion: A Societal generation is a modern concept 
According to the Swedish cultural theorist Johan Fornäs, modernity 
is comprised of three dimensions: a diachronic dimension (early, 
high and late modern); a synchronic dimension (the modes of the 
modern such as modernization, modernity and modernism) and a 
series of levels of the modern (the vertical social, cultural and 
subjective aspects of the modern). 30  
The societal generation can unquestionably be characterised 
as a high modern concept. All of the most important modern 
generational theories were formulated in Europe between 1910 and 
1933. 31  Particularly, the 1920s was a golden age of modernist 
theories, as well as modernism in intellectual societal and cultural 
movements that actively respond to the modern condition. In general, 
the period from the 1910s to the early 1930s can be called the 
classical period of the European intellectual. 32  The post-Second 
World War was the second era of the high modern.  
                                                 
29 See Kortti, “Religion and the Cultural Public Sphere. The Case of the Finnish 
Liberal Intelligentsia during the Turmoil of the Early Twentieth Century” History 
of European Ideas 44: 1 (2018), 98-112. 
30 Johan Fornäs, Cultural Theory and Late Modernity (London: Sage, 1995), 18, 
32, 39–40. 
31 The Germans mainly produced ambitious societal theories on the concept of 
generations, whereas the English wrote poems and novels, which articulated the 
conscience and destiny of generations. French descriptions of the characteristics of 
generations were created by different organised writer groups and the Italians, first 
and foremost, analysed generations in their political essays (Wohl, The Generation 
of 1914, 2–3). 
32 Ron Eyerman, Between Culture and Politics. Intellectuals in Modern Society 




If one looks at the generation of Finnish intellectuals 
discussed here from the point of view of a societal generation in a 
Mannheimian sense, the most suitable for the theory are the inter-war 
nationalists and the baby boomers. Besides having clear “formative 
experiences”, both intellectual movements attracted a rather wide 
stratum of young people and managed to generate a hegemony 
among them to a certain degree. Both were also definitely products 
of the Zeitgeist.  
However, one must remember that neither generation 
managed to acquire a total hegemony even among the young 
intellectuals of the era. Although both movements often explain the 
whole generation, there were many kinds of factions in the 
generations that certainly did not identify with the radicals.  
The main problem when applying generational theories is 
indeed that any age cohort in its entirety is often interpreted as using 
a theory-based approach. In other words, the activities of the small, 
loud vanguard of the youth are identified with the entire coeval 
masses. It is very common, for instance, that those baby boomers 
explain that they certainly did not belong to a certain group. One must 
also remember that although baby boomers formed a mass of students 
never seen before, not the whole cohort went to university, not to 
mention being radicalised. The interwar students were elite in the 
main, since those who went to university comprised a small portion 
of the cohort before the 1960s. It is also noticeable that, although 
culture played an important role in both generational movements, 
they were first and foremost ideological and political movements.  
The Fifties modernists, instead, were apolitical – except on 
cultural policy issues – and distinctively cultural. Hence, because 
they were also a very small elitist group, consisting of people of 
different ages, can we call them a generation at all?  One dimension 
of their activities was that they often made certain generational 
statements. For instance, they had a distinctive new approach to 
narrative (broken into pieces) and causality (which was avoided) in 




particularly in the critique (not only literature, but significantly also 
film), which was an important arena of the movement. In these 
statements, they wanted to distinguish themselves from the older 
literary generations. The same kind of attitude can also be discerned 
in the Tulenkantajat movement of the interwar period; that is, their 
idea that: we may be elitists, but we are very conscious of our mission 
to reform culture and to obliterate the ideas of the older generations.  
And, if one looks at the writings of the “postmodernist’s” 
generational thinking – that we are here to reform everything and it 
starts this year – becomes even central in their writings. However, if 
one looks at early twentieth century activism, one cannot find that 
kind of generational consciousness. What really pulls the liberal 
intellectuals together is not an age but a Zeitgeist. That is, one must 
fight against oppression with cultural tools, follow international 
currents and create our own unique features. But, this is a programme 
for all the enlightened, not particularly for the people of our age. As 
Robert Wohl states: “Historical generations are not born; they are 
made. They are a device by which people conceptualise society and 
seek to transform it.” 33  In order to be a generation presupposes 
consciousness of its own uniqueness and pride in its intellectual 
superiority.  
On the other hand, the fact that the Eighties generation goes 
under so many different names indicates the circumstance that the 
ideas of a modernist societal generation in the Mannheimian sense 
are also difficult to adapt for the late modern world, where identity is 
atomised in an age of reflexivity 34  and the collapse of “grand 
narratives”. 35  In other words, the young generations began 
                                                 
33 Wohl, The Generation of 1914, 5. 
34 Stuart Hall, “The Question of Cultural Identity,” in Modernity and Its Futures, 
eds Stuart Hall, David Held and Tony McGrew (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press & 
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fragmenting so much in the 1980s that coherent generalisations of 
them feels, at the very least, artificial. In addition, a generation 
acquires the sense of historical continuity, to originate in the past and 
to extend into the future. The loss of this kind of belonging was 
noticed already by the early theorists of postmodernism.36 Yet, the 
actual sense of belonging never really vanished – as we have seen in 
the rise of nationalism in the 2010s, for instance – but adhesive 
ideological movements were at least questioned when entering into 
the era of the late modern.   
To sum up, generational theories are not appropriate for all 
times and places but can be fruitful in analysing cultural history. In 
addition, since a societal generation as a social theory simplifies and 
stereotypes multidimensional phenomena, it must be used carefully, 
recalling that it is a concept created by theorists in the 1920s, who 
themselves identified with a new modern consciousness.   
 
 
                                                 
36 Lasch, The Culture of Narcissism, 5. 
